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 Hit-and-Run or Sit and Wait? Contestability Revisited in a Price 
Comparison Site Mediated Market 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The price comparison site, with its (near-) zero sunk costs of entry, would appear to 
approximate the ‘almost perfectly contestable market’ envisaged by the contestability 
theorists where ‘hit-and-run’ entry was conjectured to constrain sellers to zero profit 
outcomes. We investigate hit-and-run using a unique unbalanced panel of 295 digital 
camera markets mediated by NexTag.com. We find, however, in line with Farrell 
(1986)’s prediction, a bifurcation of strategies with low reputation/smaller 
participants favoring a hit-and-run strategy involving lower entry prices and shorter 
forays into the market than their high reputation/larger rivals. Furthermore, the 
former entrants induce a much larger price response from low reputation incumbents 
reflecting the more intense rivalry for the price-sensitive consumers willing to eschew 
retailer reputations.    
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I. Introduction  
 
This paper revisits the phenomenon of ‘hit-and-run’ entry using data from a price 
comparison site, a setting in which there are (almost) no sunk costs of market entry 
facilitating ultra-short stay visits [Baye et al (2007)]. Contestability theory [Baumol et 
al. (1982)] postulated that hit-and-run entry was a disciplinary mechanism that would 
generate competitive market outcomes irrespective of observed market structures. The 
theory suggested that potential entrants facing no sunk costs of entry and enjoying 
resource access on equal terms to those of incumbents had an incentive to make 
temporary visits to markets to undercut profit-earning incumbents, provided the latter 
were constrained by some positive response lag. It followed that any supra-normal 
profit industry configuration is unsustainable. Since the mere threat of entry is 
sufficient to generate this outcome, the extensive literature generated by contestability 
overwhelmingly ignored hit-and-run as a phenomenon, concentrating instead on the 
robustness of the theory and the testing of its prediction of the irrelevance of actual 
market structure in low sunk cost markets.1  
 
In this paper we suggest that e-commerce, especially the development of the 
price and product comparison site (PCS), has created conditions that appear to 
resemble an ‘almost perfectly contestable market’2 more closely than any previously 
observed elsewhere. However, it is noted that electronic trades are ‘experience goods’ 
in the sense that a satisfactory buyer outcome is not assured, with the moral hazard 
threat from egregious traders creating a reputational barrier to entry, even in the 
absence of conventional sunk costs. (This is consistent with the widely reported early 
mover advantages in price and/or market share enjoyed by trusted –i.e. high 
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reputation - e-sellers [Clay et al. (2001), Waldfogel and Chen (2006)].) Farrell 
(1986a) augments the assumptions of the contestability model with reputational 
heterogeneity.  Thus amended, his model overturns contestability’s competitive 
equilibrium outcome and generates a bifurcation of seller strategies, with low-
reputation sellers competing for price-sensitive consumers while high-reputation 
sellers enjoy larger margins from serving the more risk-averse buyers. This, he 
suggested would generate hit-and-run behaviour among the former sellers with the 
latter opting for a stable high-price incumbency. 
 
The paper uses a specially-constructed unbalanced panel of daily observations 
on 295 digital camera models listed on NexTag,com over a 134-day period. It finds 
that seller behaviour apparently resembling hit-and-run is commonplace. However, in 
line with Farrell’s critique of contestability, it appears that seller reputation is a key 
determinant of both the entry strategy followed and the incumbents’ response to entry. 
The results are suggestive of a clear bifurcation of strategies in line with the Farrell 
(1986a) predictions. Low-reputation/small sellers opt for transient cut-price visits - 
behaviour resembling hit-and-run entry - while high-reputation/larger entrants both 
remain longer and set higher prices. Our exploration of the incumbent price response 
to entry reinforces this. Incumbents respond to discounted entry with price cuts, but 
only to entry within their own reputation status group. Similarly, they react to 
premium price entry with price increases, again only within their own status group. In 
each case the magnitude of the response is considerably greater for the low-reputation 
group. 
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Our results contribute to several strands in the literature. First, they document 
the existence of an approximation to the hit-and-run phenomenon in an ultra-low sunk 
cost environment; although as predicted by Farrell and not the contestability theorists, 
this occurs in merely a segment of the market. Second, more generally, they 
contribute to the entry literature, particularly that part exploring the impact of new 
entry on price [Frank and Salkever (1997), Simon (2005), McCann and Vroom 
(2010)], by examining entry in the absence of almost all of the usual market frictions. 
Finally, our results also add to the rapidly growing literature on e-markets. Much of 
that work seeks to explore price and price dispersion [Haynes and Thompson (2008), 
Ellison and Snyder (2013) and references therein]. By contrast, the role of e-markets 
in lowering entry costs has been largely ignored. Our results help to reconcile two 
apparently contradictory stylized facts to emerge from research on e-commerce in 
general and PCS markets in particular: namely that while reputation commands a 
significant price premium [Waldfogel and Chen (2006) and references therein] the 
observed elasticity of demand in such markets is extremely high by comparison with 
traditional markets [Baye et al. (2009), Ellison and Ellison (2009) etc.].  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines the institutional 
arrangements in a PCS against the theoretical background of a contestable market. 
Section 3 describes the data collection and sample generation processes it employed 
and presents some sample characteristics. In Section 4 we present the empirical 
results of our investigations of run and hit respectively. First, is a duration analysis for 
market entry across the panel; and second is an investigation of the price impact of 
such entry. A conclusion follows. 
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II. Entry at a PCS Market: Institutional and Theoretical Background 
 
PCS Market Characteristics 
 
Price comparison sites such as NexTag.com are two-sided markets to which 
consumers are drawn by the provision of product and seller data and sellers are 
attracted by access to potential consumers. While there are variants to the PCS 
business model3, platforms such as NexTag.com offer sellers a free listing and access 
to enabling software. In exchange, each seller pays a fee-per-click through to their 
own web site, irrespective of whether a sale is subsequently concluded. The minimum 
fee, currently 50c to $1, usually varies between product categories in approximate 
proportion to their average price, and may be unilaterally raised by the PCS in periods 
of high demand such as the Christmas season.  Since the fee is only incurred after a 
click through, there is in principle no sunk cost associated with entry. 
 
The PCS as gatekeeper may refuse a seller admission; either because of 
congestion or the latter’s poor record in satisfying buyers. Listed sellers are displayed 
in a uniform format which includes their logo, if any, but is otherwise restricted to 
informative material; as shown in the screenshot in Figure A1 in Appendix A. The 
PCS also determines the default ranking of sellers for consumers searching by 
product, with sellers bidding above the minimum fee being rewarded with a higher 
rank. Pre-emptive bids are not accepted so a high ranking is always potentially 
vulnerable to new bidders4. Ranking is important since traffic to seller sites declines 
with position, probably quite sharply5. NexTag.com reinforces this by providing direct 
links to the three highest-ranked sellers on its product pages.  
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Clicks through to the seller’s site are not, of course, equivalent to sales. The 
average PCS conversion rate has been variously estimated at between 50% 
[Brynjolffson et al. (2004) p6] and three to five per cent [Baye et al. (2009) p2]. It is 
unclear whether this varies with price or positional ranking; although traffic generated 
by advertising on general search engines, probably lowers the merchant’s conversion 
rate6. 
 
It might be expected that e-retailing, by lowering search costs, would reduce 
prices and shrink price distributions. However, empirical research from Brynjolffson 
and Smith (2000) onwards suggested that observed price distributions in e-markets 
were comparable to those found among traditional bricks and mortar sellers. This was 
consistent with sellers using randomized pricing strategies, following the classic free-
entry models of Varian (1980) and Rosenthal (1980), to exploit uninformed/loyal 
consumers and thereby avoid Bertrand competition. Unfortunately, these insider-
outsider models also generate the prediction that prices rise with the number of 
sellers. By contrast, the empirical evidence is strongly suggestive of a negative 
correlation between number of sellers (n) and average price7.  
 
A second driver of price dispersion is reputation. Uncertainty attaching to 
payment and delivery, turns otherwise homogeneous products into experience goods, 
in the sense of Nelson (1970). Farrell (1986a) demonstrated that among sellers of 
experience goods the provision of a poor quality experience may be the optimal 
strategy for some market newcomers who lack an established reputation; not least 
because e-commerce offers considerable scope for seller misrepresentation [Ellison 
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and Ellison (2009)]. Some consumers, in anticipation of such behavior, will rationally 
shun low-price entrants in favor of higher priced established sellers8. Thus the threat 
of moral hazard behaviour by egregious sellers creates a premium for reputation and a 
de facto barrier to entry. Seller reputation is found to command a price premium in 
empirical studies [e.g. Clay et al. (2001)]. Waldfogel and Chen (2006) suggest this 
should decline as consumers gain familiarity with Internet shopping, but they in turn 
report its persistence.  
 
Recent evidence [e.g. Ghose and Yao (2007), Ellison and Ellison (2009)] 
suggests that consumer behaviour at e-markets, especially PCS-enabled ones, may be 
considerably more price sensitive than has been inferred from their (posted) price 
distributions. Baye et al. (2009) find that in an illustrative 10-seller market the lowest-
priced seller secures an average 45% of the clicks through and the lowest three take 
79%. They also report a price elasticity of -3 for sellers outside the lowest three, rising 
to -9 if a price hike costs the seller the lowest price position. Dulleck et al. (2008) find 
that 69% of offerings, overwhelmingly those with high relative prices, receive no 
weekly clicks at all. These findings suggest that the received wisdom about e-
markets’ price distributions may require some modification: First, the distribution 
weighted by sales may be very different to the posted price distribution and will 
probably display less dispersion.  Second, they suggest that a low-price entry strategy 
may be an effective means of capturing market share from incumbents.  
 
How Far does a PCS Meet the Assumptions for Contestability? 
 
8 
 
Elsewhere Haynes & Thompson (2013) show that rates of entry and exit at a PCS 
market are overwhelmingly greater than at a traditional bricks and mortar retail 
context. They estimate an error correction model which confirms that net entry flows 
are sensitive to market opportunities, to a far greater degree than would be expected in 
a conventional entry setting where sunk costs generate sluggish reactions. Building on 
from these findings, the present paper explores whether the (near) complete absence 
of sunk costs is sufficient to allow hit-and-run entry to act as a disciplinary device as 
the contestability theorists postulated.   
 
Following Baumol et al. (1982) the requirements for a perfectly contestable market 
may be summarized briefly: 
 
1. There are no sunk costs associated with entry or exit. (No Sunk Costs) 
2. Incumbents can respond to entry but only after a lag, such that hit-and-run 
entrants can exit with their profits intact. (Incumbent’s Response Lag) 
3. All current and potential market participants have access to the same 
technology/resource. (Same Resources) 
 
These assumptions have proved unrealistic when compared to entry conditions in 
conventional markets – see Geroski (1995) – but might appear to be a closer 
approximation to the conditions obtaining at a PCS platform such as NexTag.com: 
 
No Sunk Costs The initial decision to list at a PCS requires an upfront deposit, 
currently $150-$200 at most shopbots. This is subsequently exhausted by incurring 
the specified fee for clicks. There is no fee for adding additional products; larger 
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sellers many offer hundreds of separate products via each shopbot. The entrant’s only 
explicit cost is the click-through fee.  Since the conversion rate, as noted above, is 
well below unity, some sunk element is introduced. However, as the fee is small, both 
absolutely and in relation to price, and entry can be reversed at any time without 
additional expenditure, the explicit sunk costs of entering a particular product market 
appear unlikely to be much above the trivial.  
 
Sellers using a PCS clearly incur learning costs, particularly in preparing the 
“product feed” or input file. However, these costs should not be replicated when the 
retailer offers additional products or re-enters following a temporary exit. Most sellers 
in our sample offer multiple products and make frequent reversals of entry/exit 
decisions. 
 
Incumbent’s Response Lag. It seems likely that PCS participants, able to keep 
rivals’ prices under continuous observation, can respond much more quickly to entry 
than incumbents in traditional markets9; although NexTag.com suggests uploading 
may take up to 24 hours for amended offers and up to 48 hours for new listings. 
Moreover, since click data by product is normally issued to listing sellers on a daily 
basis, there may be some delay in incumbents gauging the effect of entry and 
determining an appropriate response.  We take this to constitute a response lag in the 
sense of Baumol et al. (1982).  
 
Same Resources. The standardized listing format ensures that all participating 
sellers present a similar display to potential buyers. Each seller is provided with the 
software required to monitor and amend their offerings10. Listing merely requires the 
10 
 
seller’s possession of a widely available, low-cost11 selling technology. Of course, 
established sellers may have a variety of underlying supply side advantages, including 
perhaps superior logistics, bulk discounts and - in the case of authorized dealers - 
earlier access to new models, but in principle newcomers can sell a homogeneous 
product in an identical way. Sellers are distinguished by display position but, as noted 
above, this depends primarily on the seller’s bid. 
 
An implication of the contestability assumptions is that entry is total in that 
the entrant’s output can completely – even if temporarily - replace that of the 
incumbent. This is highly unrealistic in most industries where newcomers are 
typically much smaller than incumbents [Geroski (1995)], reflecting the costs and 
time involved in making capital investments [Cairns and Mahabir (1988)]. At a PCS 
there are no such constraints. As indicated above, the limited available evidence 
suggests that the lowest priced seller does capture a disproportionate share of sales. 
 
Therefore it is conjectured that the key source of seller heterogeneity is 
reputation. If the role of reputation is sufficiently diminished by PCS intermediation, 
then entrants will represent a total threat to incumbents and hit-and-run entry will 
affect all market participants. However, where incumbents retain a reputational 
advantage with at least some potential consumers, hit-and-run entry will have a 
restricted effect. In particular, following Farrell (1986a), it is conjectured that the 
market will be segmented with hit-and-run entry effective in the low-price segment, 
where consumers are either less risk-averse or otherwise more price-sensitive, and 
largely ineffective in the retailer brand-dominated higher price segment.  
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Finally, it should be noted that exit might be considered a puzzle in a market 
where there are apparently no costs to remaining. Unless inventory is exhausted – in 
which case exit is required to forestall costly unanswerable clicks through - why leave 
if there is any non-zero probability of a sale? While this paper is exploring hit-and-run 
behaviour, the literature considers numerous strategic pricing considerations – see 
Baye et al (2007) – some of which suggest at least partial explanations:  
 
First, sellers multi-home across platforms but normally post a single price; 
meaning that a seller undercut in market A may prefer to withdraw rather than cut 
price to market B as well. Second, posting a non-competitive price may deliver 
reputational damage for avowed low-price retailers. Third, Baye et al (2007) point to 
the danger of e-retailers being “stuck-in-the-middle”, where they neither enjoy the 
sales volume of the cheapest nor the margins of those selling only to their most loyal 
customers. Fourth, early withdrawal by price cutters may forestall incumbent 
retaliation with the accompanying threat to everyone’s margins. Lastly, e-retailers 
suffer if their prices are predictable - and hence easily undercut - by rivals. Frequent 
entry and exit enhance uncertainty and make behaviour less predictable .  
 
Sample and Data 
 
NexTag.com is a typical general merchandise PCS being particularly strong in high 
value-to-weight products such as consumer electronics. The digital camera was 
selected as the product for analysis; since its purchase is typically a discrete event, 
thus avoiding any multiple purchase discounts that impact, say, book buying. NexTag 
provides buyers and sellers with daily updated data on the pre- and post-tax prices of 
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listing sellers, delivered prices, feedback on seller reputation and limited information 
on model characteristics for each camera listed. Unless an alternative is specified by 
the user, the default ranking of sellers is determined by the PCS, as illustrated in 
Appendix A. Additional information available includes a diagram of the product’s 
price history and a histogram showing the number of leads – or clicks through to 
seller – on a monthly basis for a period up to 17 months.  
 
A Java program was written to extract data from the NexTag.com screen 
display. The program was run daily12 (at 2.00am EST) between November 19th 2007 
and March 31st 2008, an interval chosen to include the Xmas season. A separate 
program was used to extract data on the level of leads or clicks through, which were 
available on a monthly basis. The target sample was updated weekly to allow for the 
entry of new models, each identified by its unique product code (upc)13. Excluded 
were pre-2006 models, assumed to be discontinued, cameras bundled with 
complementary products and models posting prices below $50 to reduce the 
likelihood of including refurbished or misreported items. Further exclusions for the 
non-availability of leads data and thin markets, here defined as cases where the 
number of leads never reached 100 per month, reduced the final sample to 295 
models14. 
 
In addition, information was collected on the month and year in which the 
camera was introduced to the market and the format group to which it belonged 
(compact, ultra-compact, SLR or SLR-type). PCS data are sometimes contaminated 
by different treatments of taxes and shipping. However, NexTag.com provides both 
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net and post-sales tax prices and the price inclusive of shipping costs15. We used the 
net price in a zero tax state in our analysis16.  
 
Scrutiny of the raw data immediately confirms two of our prior conjectures on 
PCSs: first, these markets are used, at least intermittently, by large numbers of sellers; 
and second, PCSs exhibit very high rates of entry and exit. These findings are 
considered in turn: 
 
The data confirmed the general accessibility of PCSs to sellers. In total 161 
different sellers participated in the 295 sample NexTag.com camera model markets 
over a maximum of a 134 day interval of scrutiny.  The average individual market on 
any day listed 16 sellers, with a mean of 71 separate sellers participating daily across 
all model markets in the sample. This is consistent with the existence of a substantial 
reservoir of potential entrants ready to join as opportunities arise.  Sellers ranged from 
large general and/or on-line retailers such as Amazon.com, who participated in 95% of 
the sample markets at some stage, to the 37 sellers who participated in five markets or 
less during the period investigated.  
 
Entrants (including re-entrants) averaged 188 per day and exits17 averaged 176 
per day. Given an average of 16 sellers per market, this is equivalent to 27% leaving 
and being replaced each week18, a far higher rate of churn than observed in 
conventional markets.  
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The average duration of completed spells is 8.68 days and the median is 4 
days. The Kaplan-Meier function showing the proportion of surviving entries is given 
in Figure 1 and exhibits substantial early attrition.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here]  
 
 
When entry duration was compared by size or by reputation it was apparent 
that larger/high-reputation entrants remained in the market for longer than their 
smaller and/or low-reputation rivals. For example, denoting as “large” those retailers 
which figured in the Dealerscope leading 100 US electronics goods sellers for 2007 
and as “small” those that did not, it appeared that smaller retailers had a mean stay of 
7 continuous days (median 3), while large sellers averaged 11 continuous days stay 
(median 5). Examining duration length by seller reputation produces a similar result. 
Reputation, of course, is a multidimensional concept reflecting consumers’ past 
experience of - and anticipated future interactions with - the seller. Here we measure 
seller reputation by the number of seller stars listed in the user-generated feedback 
displayed for consumers on Nextag.com. A seller possessing a “high” reputation was 
defined as one who was awarded four or more stars, while “low” reputation was 
defined by less than four stars. High-reputation sellers stayed on average for 11 
continuous days (median 6), while low-reputation sellers averaged 6 continuous days 
(median 3).  
 
Plotting the Kaplan-Maier survival functions confirms the more rapid exit 
among smaller and low-reputation entrants, with a log-rank test [p=0.000] rejecting 
the null hypothesis of a common survivor function in each case. The functions 
according to reputation are shown for illustrative purposes in Figure 2.  
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[Insert Figure 2 here] 
  
Differences were also apparent in the pricing strategy of different entrants. 
Subtracting the entrant’s price from the mean price of incumbent suppliers present the 
previous day yields -$7.72 for large entrants (median $3.19) and $38.68 (median 
$23.18) for their smaller rivals. The mean difference is highly significant [t=-30.772; 
p=0.0000]. In contrast to their smaller rivals, larger entrants do not appear to offer 
price discounts over incumbent suppliers. The relevant figures for low- and high-
reputation entrants is $38.39 (median $22.65) and $4.74 (median $6.96) respectively. 
Again, the mean difference is highly significant [t=-22.778; p=0.0000].    
 
A comparison of the duration of market membership confirms that low-priced 
entrants exit earlier. Discounted retailers stayed on average for 7 continuous days 
(median 3); while non-discounted sellers averaged 12 continuous days stay (median 
5). Figure 3 shows the survival functions by pricing strategy. Once again, a log-rank 
test [p=0.000] clearly rejects the null hypothesis that the survivor functions of the two 
groups are the same.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here]  
 
 
III. An Empirical Analysis of  Hit and Run 
 
 A Duration Analysis of Entry 
  
16 
 
A hit-and-run strategy is taken to involve entry below the incumbent price followed 
by subsequent exit upon the incumbent’s price response. To explore this we 
investigate the impact of entry pricing strategy on the exit hazard, having controlled 
for underlying characteristics such as size and reputation. Specifically, we postulate a 
conditional probability for new market entrants of the form: 
 
],,,[)( PMSEfExitp tt                                                                                         …(1) 
 
Where E is a vector of entry characteristics, including the entrant’s relative price on 
entry, S represents seller characteristics capturing reputation and seller size effects; 
whilst Mt is a vector of time varying market characteristics. Finally, P is a vector of 
product characteristics, including camera format and age19.  
The entrant vector includes a binary variable Discount for entrants pricing 
below the incumbents’ mean price and which are therefore assumed to “hit” the latter. 
Relative Price is the entrant’s price relative to the mean price of the remaining sellers 
in that model’s market on that day. Also included is the entrant’s time-varying 
Position in the default seller listing in each model’s market on each day, the number 
of Co-entrants on the day of entry and a count of the number of Products each 
entrant listed on NexTag.com at the start of our data collection period. Aspects of 
reputation are captured by the number of seller Stars listed in the user-generated 
feedback displayed by the shopbot at the time of entry and Authorized dealer status; 
whilst Large sellers are distinguished by membership of Dealerscope’s top 100 
electronics retailers. To capture our expectation of greater exit in more congested 
markets the number of Sellers and the (log of) market size (Lmarket_size) were 
included. Following prior research on shopbots (e.g. Baye et al, 2004), market size is 
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captured by the number of leads – or clicks through to sellers - relative to the number 
of sellers. The product characteristics vector included quadratic terms in age since 
launch (Age, Agesq), to control for life cycle effects, and binary variables (SLR, 
SLR-type, Compact, Ultra-compact) to denote the four recognized product formats. 
The summary statistics for the period averages of the continuous variables are given 
in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
The duration of entry is explored using the Cox proportional hazard model. 
This model allows a flexible form for the underlying baseline hazard compared to 
parametric models. It can also easily accommodate right censoring20 which is a 
feature in our data. Applying the Cox proportional hazard model, the conditional 
hazard rate )(0 t faced by the j’th retailer is proportional to the baseline hazard that 
all retailers face, modified by regressors xj: 
 
)()()|( 0 jjj xtxt                                                                                             …(2)  
 
We assume an underlying exponential form [i.e. )( jjx  =exp( )( jjx  ] and 
also extend the model to include time-varying regressors. There are two potentially 
endogenous variables in the regression: discounted entry (Discount) and Relative 
Price. As an instrument for the Discount variable we use predicted values from a 
probit regression of discounted entry on seller reputation variables21, after the 
approach of Vella and Verbeck (1999)22, and re-estimate the hazard function using 
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bootstrapped standard errors. Finding a suitable instrument for the  Relative Price 
proved intractable so we estimated the model with and without this variable.  
 
The results from the Cox proportional hazard model are reported in Table 2. 
For ease of interpretation, the hazard ratios are reported rather than the coefficients 
themselves. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for equation (2) with and without 
the Relative Price variable respectively. Columns (3) and (4) show the results after 
the Discount variable has been instrumented and the reputation variables have been 
excluded from the regression, again with and without the Relative Price variable. It is 
immediately apparent that Discount entrants experience a substantially larger exit rate 
than non-discounters and that this effect is highly significant (for example, z=12.78 in 
Column (1))23.  The estimated effect is even larger for the instrumented results in 
Columns (3) and (4). This confirms the observation from the raw data that discounters 
tend to have shorter market tenure than their higher-priced rivals. 
 
Obtaining high e-visibility by out-bidding rivals for ranking position is an 
obvious substitute for price-cutting as an entry strategy and one that also directly 
impacts the seller’s profit margin. In the event Position did raise the hazard, but by a 
relatively small amount with merely borderline significance.24 The average number of 
Products also increased the hazard slightly indicating that more intensive users of the 
price comparison site are more likely to exit early from the market. This could be the 
result of entry/re-entry costs being lower, given the fee structure of the PCS, for 
larger/more intensive users. By contrast, bigger and higher reputation entrants display 
much lower hazard rates. The Large entrant, Seller Stars and Authorized dealer 
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variables, each capturing aspects of reputation, generate hazard ratios well below 
unity with high levels of significance.  
 
[Insert Table 2 & 3 about here] 
 
Turning to the market characteristics, Relative Price, attracts a significant positive 
coefficient indicating many discounters exit even before the market has fully adjusted 
to their entry. Posting low prices – whether on entry or later - is therefore associated 
with higher hazard rates among entrants, as might be expected with a hit-and-run 
approach. Any congestion effects, as captured by Lmarket_size and the number of 
Sellers are very small. Among the control variables, the number of Co-entrants 
attracts a negative coefficient, consistent with a common supply side stimulus, while 
the Age variables are completely insignificant. The format variables are also largely 
insignificant. As shown, the removal of the Relative Price variable from the 
estimating equation and the instrumentation of the Discount variable does not 
materially affect the pattern of results.  
 
In order to assess Farrell’s prediction that ultra-low sunk costs coupled with 
reputational differences will lead to a bifurcation of entry strategies, we constructed 
an interaction term between the seller star and the discounted entry variables. The 
results from this estimation are reported in Table 3. As shown, the hazard is 
significantly higher for low reputation, discounted sellers25. While the mean tenure for 
all entrants to the PCS is relatively short, the entrant’s hazard falls with the reputation 
of the seller, as would be expected where more established retailers enter to cater for 
brand-loyal consumers.  
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Measuring the Hit: Estimating the Price Impact of Entry 
 
We next explore the price response of incumbents to different entry strategies and 
differences in the intensity of entry. The observed high rates of entry and exit, coupled 
with the rapid reactions permitted by e-trading, generate events at a much higher 
frequency than is observed in studying traditional markets. Observations at intervals 
longer than a day involve conflating the effects of multiple events. Accordingly we 
use a simple regression framework to compare mean responses on a daily basis, with 
the empirical design: 
 
tttt ecXbEaP   11
*log                                                                               …(3) 
 
Where ΔlogP*t denotes the change in the log of the mean price of suppliers present at 
t-1 and t, i.e. excluding that of new entrants at t-1. *log tP  is alternatively calculated 
for all incumbents and for those whose characteristics coincide with and contrast with 
those of the corresponding entrant. E is a vector of characteristics describing the 
entrants, if any, at t-1. X denotes exit at t-1 and e is an error term.  
 
Incumbent sellers have three possible reactions to market entry: change price, 
exit or do nothing26. The more the market inclines to full contestability the more we 
might expect incumbents that wish to retain sales to reduce prices in the face of low-
price entry. Moreover, if low prices dominate reputation we might expect this to hold 
whatever the correspondence between the entrant’s reputation and that of the 
incumbent(s).  Conversely, if reputation segments the market, as Farrell (1986a) 
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predicted, we would expect the price effects of entry to be primarily restricted to the 
relevant market segment. Research on conventional markets also suggests a price cut 
response to entry is particularly associated with low reputation/new incumbents27  
 
It is immediately clear that entry lowers the mean price of surviving 
incumbents, with multiple entry having a significant additional effect. Table 4 shows 
the impact of any entry at t-1 on the mean price of the continuing incumbents: i.e. 
firms other than entrants present at both t-1 and t28. It is also apparent that incumbents 
do not respond uniformly. When incumbents are split, as before, by their star rating, 
the impact on low-reputation incumbents is approximately six times that of their high-
reputation rivals; with a large additional multi-entry effect confined to the former.  
 
If we split the entrants into high and low reputation, the results in Table 5 
confirm that entry by low-reputation sellers (Low_Rep_Entry) has a substantial and 
highly significant impact on low-reputation incumbents. By contrast, high-reputation 
entrants (High_Rep_Entry) reduce the price of high reputation incumbents but by a 
much smaller proportion. 
 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here]  
 
 
 
Table 6 divides entrants into discounters (Discounted Entry) and non-
discounters (Non-discounted Entry), according to their price relative to the average 
at the time of entry. A discounter is defined as an entrant pricing below the 
incumbents’ mean price. Here an even sharper picture emerges with incumbents 
reacting to discounted entry with significant price cuts and non-discounted entry with 
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significant price increases. Again the negative effects are much stronger for low-
reputation sellers, reinforcing the result that competition on price is keener among 
low-reputation sellers. Table 7 repeats the exercise by e-visibility, splitting the 
entrants according to whether or not they are placed in the top three places (Top3 
Entry) in the NexTag.com default listing. This confirms that ranking matters, with 
Top3 entrants having a much greater impact on all incumbents than their lower 
ranked rivals. Again the effect appears to be much greater for the low-reputation 
incumbents. 
 
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 here] 
 
 
In Table 8 the high and low reputation and discounted and non-discounted 
pricing strategies are used to distinguish four categories of entrant, whose separate 
effects on incumbent prices are reported. It is apparent that Discounted Entry has a 
strong negative effect on incumbents’ prices; Non-discounted Entry serves as a 
signal to raise prices. Moreover, while these effects are symmetric across the sample 
as a whole, they turn out to be confined to incumbents of the same reputation 
category: for example, discounted entry by low reputation sellers reduces the mean 
price of other low reputation sellers by almost two percent, whilst leaving the prices 
of high reputation sellers effectively unchanged. Discounted Entry by high 
reputation sellers similarly reduces incumbent prices only in the high reputation 
market segment and then to a much smaller extent. Our results may be contrasted with 
research on traditional markets, where entry by low reputation sellers typically 
produces a price response which is largely confined to low reputation/new incumbents 
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in, for example, pharmaceuticals [Frank and Salkever (1997)], magazines [Simon 
(2005)] and hotels [McCann and Vroom (2010) ]. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Finally, in Table 9 the three pairs of entrant characteristics are combined to 
yield eight entrant types, whose separate impacts on incumbents are then assessed. 
The results confirm that the price effects of entry are very largely specific to sellers in 
the reputation category of the entrant. The effect of the superior electronic exposure 
enjoyed by the top three serves largely to increase the absolute value of the respective 
same category coefficients, generally by the equivalent of one to two percentage 
points. Whether this is indicative of limited search of rivals’ prices by sellers or their 
anticipation of such behaviour by potential buyers cannot be determined. The overall 
pattern of coefficients is remarkably robust with one exception, namely that high 
reputation non-discounted entrants exercise a small negative effect on low-reputation 
sellers. This appears to be a consequence of entry by a single market leader. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here]  
 
It is clear that the intra-segment price effects of entry are highly significant if 
modest in size.  Their magnitude should be set against three caveats: first, average 
profit margins are already comparatively small for sellers using PCS markets, 
particularly in the low-reputation segment; second, since the price effect relates 
strictly to remaining incumbents it ignores any displacement of higher-priced sellers 
arising as a consequence of entry; and third, ours is necessarily a short-term analysis 
and it ignores any dynamic processes affecting pricing. 
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Further Experiments with the Data 
 
 
It has been seen that sellers vary in their entry strategies with some – usually low-
reputation and/or smaller sellers - tending to opt for shorter duration spells in  the 
market than others, usually  their high-reputation and/or larger rivals.  Since the 
sellers typically face one another across multiple product markets within the same 
PCS, it appears likely that some learning occurs allowing incumbents to predict 
whether entrants pose a temporary or more permanent threat. To explore this we 
classify each of the sellers in the sample as “temporary” or “permanent” according to 
whether their average completed duration is above or below the sample mean.  If hit-
and-run pricing is largely confined to low-reputation/smaller sellers, as we observe, 
we conjecture that paradoxically the price impact of entry will be greatest for those 
entrants perceived to be temporary. This is explored in Table 10, where it can be seen 
that entry by short-term visitors (Temporary Entry) does induce price cutting, 
consistent with it being overwhelmingly by low reputation incumbents. This 
reinforces our finding of a bifurcated market. 
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
 
In addition to investigating the average incumbent response to entry, we also 
examined the response by the lowest-priced incumbent only. If consumers use a price 
ranking default when searching, the lowest-price incumbent might be expected to 
respond to being undercut, if only by dropping her price slightly below the entrant’s. 
In the event the price cut for the lowest incumbent alone was insignificant.  
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Since the mean price in a market will be affected by the distribution of high 
and low reputation seller in that market, we also located the entrant’s nearest 
competitor in that market, and also the nearest competitor by reputation-type. We 
obtained a negative but insignificant price response from that incumbent but with a 
larger absolute magnitude reported for the low reputation entrants29. Thus, our 
previous results using the mean response from incumbents of the same reputation-
type supports the notion that it is not just the closest incumbent who is responding to 
entry by dropping their price. The distribution of responses across all incumbents may 
be an interesting avenue for future research.    
 
Finally, we investigated whether the institutional property of the payments 
mechanism at the shopbot may have generated involuntary exits and re-entries with 
implications for the analysis. Newcomers whose initial deposit of $100-$150 is 
exhausted by consumers’ clicks and who fail to renew it can be temporarily excluded. 
We reclassified exits as a continuing presence where exit was reversed a day later 
with no difference in the terms of supply. This made no material difference to our 
results. 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
We have presented results suggesting that in PCS-mediated markets something 
resembling hit-and-run entry is a real phenomenon and not merely a theoretical 
curiosity. The absence of sunk costs combined with a format which constrains all 
sellers to present in a similar way facilitates a much higher rate of entry and exit than 
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has been observed in conventional markets. However, seller heterogeneity, 
particularly with regard to reputation, prevents shopbot markets meeting the full 
assumptions [Baumol et al. (1982)] for perfect contestability. In line with the 
theoretical prediction of Farrell (1986), we find that reputational differences among 
sellers produce an effective bifurcation of the market, with both entry strategies and 
incumbent responses to entry depending on the seller’s status. Smaller and/or low-
reputation sellers typically make brief visits to the market generally offering prices 
below the current mean. This draws an immediate price response from incumbent 
sellers. However, this response appears entirely confined to other low-
reputation/smaller sellers. High reputation and/or larger sellers are unaffected. By 
contrast, entry by larger/high-reputation sellers tends to be longer-lasting and to be 
associated with pricing above the existing mean. It is thus among the no/low 
reputation and/or smaller sellers that something approximating to hit-and-run 
behavior is observed.  
 
High reputation/larger sellers entering with a price below the mean also trigger 
a significant immediate price fall, but this is restricted to other sellers of a similar 
status. It is typically much smaller than that observed among low-reputation/smaller 
incumbents when joined by a similar entrant. This is consistent with a relatively 
reduced role for price competition in this segment of the market. 
 
Entry at prices above the existing mean produces a significant average price 
increase among incumbents. This holds for both segments of the market; although the 
proportionate effect is greater among low-reputation/smaller sellers where it is also 
less frequent. Again there are generally no cross-segment effects. Why high-priced 
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entry functions as a signal in this respect is not entirely clear; although there are 
parallels in other markets with frequent price changes, most obviously in the literature 
on Edgeworth cycles in gasoline markets [Doyle et al. (2010)]. 
 
An interesting feature of PCS markets is that sellers can buy e-visibility by 
bidding above the minimum fee-per-click. It was noted that this may be a rational 
strategy where restricted consumer search implies disproportionate traffic to the most 
visible sellers in the shopbot’s default ranking, as Baye et al, (2009) report. We find 
that additional e-visibility, defined by membership of the three highest ranked sellers 
changes the size but not the direction of the price effect. Again the effect is very much 
larger for the low-reputation/smaller sellers. 
 
Our results help to reconcile two stylized facts of e-markets: first, that price 
competition is much fiercer here than in a traditional market setting; and second, that 
reputation continues to command a significant price premium. They suggest a 
bifurcation of the market into a low-reputation-low-price segment, where sellers 
compete for price-sensitive (and less risk-averse) consumers and a high-reputation-
high-price segment for more risk-averse consumers. In the former segment something 
approaching the hit-and-run behavior predicted by contestability theorists is observed 
as entrants, often newcomers with little or no reputation, make temporary market 
visits with low-price offerings. 
 
Among the unresolved issues of PCS market operation is the role of voluntary 
exit. If market presence only becomes costly when consumers click through to the 
seller’s site, why do sellers withdraw so quickly? Three possible explanations are 
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suggested: First, low-price/smaller sellers typically possess a modest inventory and 
exit once this becomes exhausted. Second, some sellers finding themselves under-cut 
by segment rivals and making correspondingly few sales, withdraw to avoid either 
being perceived as high-price or having to make a price cut that - given multi-homing 
– affects their profits elsewhere. Third, that in part exit reflects some underlying 
recognition of the need to avoid descent into a pure Bertrand outcome. That is, it is 
part of some variant of a randomized pricing strategy extended to include zero 
product offerings. These conjectures require further research. 
29 
 
References 
 
Baumol, William J., Panzar John C. & Willig Robert D. 1982. Contestable Markets 
and the Theory of Industry Structure. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: San Diego. 
 
Baye, Michael R. and Morgan, John (2001) Information Gatekeepers on the Internet 
and the Competitiveness of Homogenous Product Markets, American 
Economic Review, 91, 454-474 
 
Baye, Michael R., Morgan, J and Scholten, Patrick (2004) ‘Price dispersion in the 
small and in the large: Evidence from an Internet price comparison site.’ 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 52, 463-96. 
 
Baye, Michael, Gatti, J.Rupert, Kattuman, Paul and Morgan John (2009) Clicks, 
Discontinuities and Firm Demand Online, Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy,18, (4), 935-75. 
Baye, Michael, Gatti, J.Rupert Kattuman, Paul and Morgan J. (2007) A Dashboard for 
On-line Pricing, Californian Management Review, 50, (1), 202-16. 
 
Brynjolffson, Eric and Smith Michael D. (2000), Frictionless Commerce? A 
Comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers, Management Science, 46, 
(4), 563-585 
 
Brynjolffson, Eric, Dick A. and Smith Michael (2004) Search and Product 
Differentiation at an Internet Shopbot, MIT Working Paper #194 
30 
 
 
Cairns, Robert D. and Mahabir, Dhanayshar (1988) Contestability: A Revisionist 
View, Economica, 55, (214), 269-76. 
 
Clay Karen, Krishnan, Ramayya and Wolff, Eric (2001) Prices and Price Dispersion 
on the Web: Evidence from the Online Book Industry, Journal of Industrial 
Economics 50, (4),521-540 
 
Cox, David (1972), ‘Regression models and life-tables (with discussion), Journal of 
the Royal Statistical Society, series B 34, 248-75     
 
Doyle, Joseph J. Muehlegger, Erich and Sampantharak, Krislert (2010) Edgeworth 
Cycles Revisited, Energy Economics, 32, (3) 651-660 
  
Dulleck, Uwe, Hackl, Franz, Weiss, B. and Winter-Ebner, Rudolf (2008) Buying 
Online: Sequential Decision-Making by Shopbot Visitors, working paper 
#0810, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz 
 
Ellison, Glen and Ellison, Sara F. (2009) Search, Obfuscation and Price Elasticities on 
the Internet, Econometrica, 77, (2) 427-52. 
 
Ellison, Sara F. and Snyder, Christopher (2013) An Empirical Study of Pricing 
Strategies in an On-line Market with High-frequency Price Information, M.I.T. 
Working Paper Accessed at: http://economics.mit.edu/files/8854, on 29/7/13. 
 
31 
 
Farrell, Joseph (1986a) Moral Hazard as an Entry Barrier, Rand Journal of 
Economics, 17, (3), 440-449. 
 
Farrell, Joseph (1986b)  How Effective is Potential Competition?  Economics Letters, 
20, (1),67-70. 
 
Frank, Richard and Salkever, David (1997) Generic Entry and the Pricing of 
Pharmaceuticals, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6, (1), 75-
90. 
 
Geroski, Paul (1995) What Do we Really Know about Entry, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 13, (4), 421-440. 
 
Ghose, Anindya and Yao, Y.O. (2007) Goodbye Price Dispersion? New Evidence 
from Transaction Prices in Electronic Markets, Third Research Symposium on 
Statistical Challenges in E-commerce Research, University of Connecticut, 
May. 
 
Haynes, Michelle and Thompson, Steve (2008) ‘Price, Price Dispersion and Number 
of Sellers at a Low Entry Cost Shopbot.’ International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 26, (2), 459-472 
 
Haynes, Michelle and Thompson, Steve (2013) ‘Entry and Exit Behaviour in the 
Absence of Sunk Costs: Evidence from a Price Comparison Site’, Review of 
Industrial Organization, 42, (1), 1-23 
32 
 
 
Heckman, James J. (1978) Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous 
Equation System, Econometrica, 46, (4), 931-59 
 
Heckman, James J. (1979) Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error, 
Econometrica, 47, (1), 153-62. 
 
Hurdle Gloria.J., Johnson Richard L., Joskow Andrew S., Werden Gregory J. & 
Williams Michael A. (1989) Concentration, Potential Entry and Performance 
in the Airline Industry. Journal of Industrial Economics 38, (2), 119-140. 
 
McCann BrianT. and Vroom Govert (2010) Pricing Response to Entry and 
Agglomeration Effects, Strategic Management Journal, 31, (3), 284-305. 
 
Morrison, Stephen A and Winston, Clifford (1987) Empirical Implications and Tests 
of the Contestability Hypothesis, Journal of Law and Economics, 39, (1), 53-
66 
 
Nelson, Phillip (1970) Information and Consumer Behavior, Journal of Political 
Economy, 78, (2), 311-29. 
 
OFT (2007) Economic Literature Review: Internet Shopping: Report Prepared for the 
Office of Fair Trading, Annex F, OFT921f, London. 
 
33 
 
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Tirole, Jean (2006) Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 
Rand Journal of Economics, 37, (3): 645-667 
 
Rosenthal, Robert (1980) A Model in Which an Increase in the Number of Sellers 
Leads to a Higher Price, Econometrica, 48, (6),1575-1580. 
 
Shepherd William G. (1984) Contestability versus Competition American Economic 
Review 74: (2), 572-587. 
 
Simon, D. (2005) Incumbent Pricing Responses to Entry, Strategic Management 
Journal, 26, 13, 1229-48. 
 
Varian, Hal (1980) A Model of Sales, American Economic Review, 70, (4), 817-830. 
 
Vella, F. and Verbeek, M. (1999) Estimating and Interpreting Models with 
Endogenous Treatment Effects, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 17, (4), 
473-478. 
 
Weitzman M.L. (1983) Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry 
Structure: A Comment,  American Economic Review 73, (2), 486-87. 
 
Waldfogel, Joel and Chen, L. (2006) Does Information Undermine Brand? 
Information Intermediary Use and Preference for Branded Retailers, Journal 
of Industrial Economics, 54, (4), 425-450. 
34 
 
 Appendix A 
Figure A1. Nextag Screen Output 
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Table A1. Duration of entrants’ participation: Cox proportional hazard model 
including time varying regressors 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Minimum Price Entry 1.4065   
(0.0240)***     
1.4370   
(0.0241)***     
  
Minimum Price Low Reputation 
Entry 
  1.6100 
(0.0293)*** 
1.6448 
(0.0294)*** 
Minimum Price High  Reputation  
Entry 
  0.9373 
(0.0328)* 
0.9482 
(0.0331) 
Seller Position 1.0024   
(0 .0012)**      
1.0024   
(0 .0012)**      
1.0023   
(0 .0012)*      
1.0023   
(0 .0012)*      
Number of Co-entrants 0 .9354   
(0 .0039)***    
0 .9353   
(0 .0039)***    
0 .9355   
(0 .0039)***    
0 .9354   
(0 .0039)***    
Products  1.0016 
(0.0001) *** 
1.0016 
(0.0001) *** 
1.0015 
(0.0001) *** 
1.0015 
(0.0001) *** 
Top 100 0.7588   
(0 .0115)*** 
0.7529   
(0 .0114)*** 
0.7759  
(0 .0120)*** 
0.7709   
(0 .0119)*** 
Seller Stars  0.9288   
(0 .0046)***    
 0.9299   
(0 .0046)***    
 0.9489   
(0 .0048)***    
 0.9504   
(0 .0048)***    
Authorised Dealer 0.9193   
(0 .0294)***     
0.9173   
(0 .0291)***     
0.9308   
(0 .0299)**     
0.9291   
(0 .0297)**     
Number of Sellers 0.9972   
(0 .0011)**     
0.9974   
(0 .0011)**     
0.9960   
(0 .0011)***     
0.9962   
(0 .0011)***     
Log of Market Size 1.0100    
(0.0064)      
1.0115    
(0.0064)*      
1.0073    
(0.0063)      
1.0089    
(0.0063)*      
Relative Price 1.0004   
(0 .0001)***      
 1.0003   
(0 .0001)***      
 
Age 1.0002    
(0.0001)*     
1.0001    
(0.0001)     
1.0001    
(0.0001)     
1.0001    
(0.0001)     
Age-squared 0.9999   
(0.0000)**      
0.9999   
(0.0000)**      
0.9999   
(0.0000)**      
0.9999   
(0.0000)*      
SLR 0.9813   
(0.0238)     
0.9986   
(0.0241)     
0.9906   
(0.0237)     
0.9999  
(0.0240)     
Compact 0.9805   
(0 .0208) 
0.9798   
(0.0208) 
0.9864   
(0.0206) 
0.9860   
(0.0205) 
Ultra-compact 0.9891   
(0.0214)     
0.9888   
(0.0214)     
0.9901   
(0.0211)     
0.9899   
(0.0211)     
     
Wald test 
[p-value] 
4196.24 
[0.000] 
4123.90 
[0.000] 
4847.05 
[0.000] 
4813.34 
[0.000] 
Number of Entrants 22,079 22,079 22,079 22,079 
Number of Observations 187,757 187,757 187,757 187,757 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimated coefficients in columns (1) and 
(2). Bootstrapped standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimated coefficients in columns (3) 
and (4): *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier Survival Function Estimate 
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Figure 2. Kaplan-Meier Survival Function Estimate by Seller Reputation 
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Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier Survival Function Estimate by Entry Price Strategy 
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TABLE 1 
  
Summary statistics 
 
 Mean Median S.D. No. of 
Obs. 
     
Sellers 16.26 16 7.28 187,757 
Leads 473.18 208 731.41 187,757 
Market Size 0.135 0.06 0.32 187,757 
Co-entrants 1.05 1 1.491 187,757 
Age (days) 268 220 180.26 187,757 
Entrant’s position 8.68 7 6.29 187,757 
Seller Stars 3.42 4 1.47 187,757 
Product Count 164.25 124.99 141.01 187,757 
Entrant’s relative price at exit 3.185 5.675 101.273 187,757 
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TABLE 2 
 
Duration of entrants’ participation: Cox proportional hazard model including time 
varying regressors 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Discounted Entry 1.24043   
(0.0205)***     
1.2737   
(0.0203)***     
  
Discounted Entry: Instrumented   1.8253   
(0.0873)***     
1.9575   
(0.1058)***     
Seller Position 1.0024   
(0 .0012)**      
1.0024   
(0 .0012)**      
1.0028   
(0 .0012)**      
1.0029   
(0 .0013)**      
Number of Co-entrants 0 .9363   
(0 .0039)***    
0 .9363   
(0 .0039)***    
0 .9355   
(0 .0036)***    
0 .9353   
(0 .0038)***    
Products  1.0017 
(0.0001) *** 
1.0017 
(0.0001) *** 
1.0015 
(0.0001) *** 
1.0015 
(0.0001) *** 
Top 100 0.7336   
(0 .0109)*** 
0.7282   
(0 .0108)*** 
  
Seller Stars  0.9117   
(0 .0045)***    
 0.9113   
(0 .0045)***    
  
Authorised Dealer 0.8631   
(0 .0283)***     
0.8563   
(0 .0279)***     
  
Number of Sellers 0.9943   
(0 .0011)***     
0.9942   
(0 .0011)***     
0.9948   
(0 .0012)***     
0.9947   
(0 .0012)***     
Log of Market Size 1.0059    
(0 .0063)      
1.0075    
(0 .0064)      
1.0118    
(0 .0064)*      
1.0149    
(0 .0069)**      
Relative Price 1.0004   
(0 .0001)***      
 1.0007    
(0 .0001)***       
 
Age 1.0002    
(0.0001)*     
1.0001    
(0.0001)     
1.0003   
(0 .0001)***      
1.0002   
(0 .0001)**      
Age-squared 0.9999   
(0.0000)**      
0.9999   
(0.0000)      
0.9999   
(0.0000)***      
0.9999   
(0.0000)**      
SLR 0.9677   
(0.0237)     
0.9846   
(0 .0241)     
0.9260   
(0.0263)***      
0.9524   
(0.0229)**      
Compact 0.9783   
(0 .0209) 
0.9775   
(0 .0209) 
0.9603   
(0 .0217)*     
0.9577   
(0 .0212)*     
Ultra-compact 0.9931   
(0.0216)     
0.9928   
(0.0217)     
0.9840   
(0 .0230) 
0.9839   
(0 .0233) 
     
Wald test 
[p-value] 
3642.14 
[0.000] 
3530.05 
[0.000] 
2054.25 
[0.000] 
1617.44 
[0.000] 
Number of Entrants 22,079 22,079 22,079 22,079 
Number of Observations 187,757 187,757 187,757 187,757 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimated coefficients in columns (1) and 
(2). Bootstrapped standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimated coefficients in columns (3) 
and (4): *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 3 
 
Duration of entrants’ participation: Cox proportional hazard model including time 
varying regressors, split by entrant’s reputation  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Discounted Low Reputation Entry 1.6332   
(0.0329)***     
1.6729   
(0.0328)***     
  
Discounted High Reputation Entry 0.94107   
(0.0189)***     
0.9584   
(0.0189)***     
  
Discounted Low Rep Entry: Instrumented   2.1577   
(0.1268)***     
2.1957   
(0.0952)***     
Discounted High Rep Entry: 
Instrumented 
  0.8777   
(0.0347)***     
0.8807   
(0.0275)***     
Seller Position 1.0027   
(0 .0012)**      
1.0027   
(0 .0012)**      
1.0025   
(0 .0013)**      
1.0025   
(0 .0012)**      
Number of Co-entrants 0 .9368   
(0 .0040)***    
0 .9368   
(0 .0040)***    
0 .9356   
(0 .0034)***    
0 .9354   
(0 .0041)***    
Products  1.0014 
(0.0001) *** 
1.0014 
(0.0001) *** 
1.0015 
(0.0001) *** 
1.0015 
(0.0001) *** 
Top 100 0.7746   
(0 .0120)*** 
0.7702   
(0 .0119)*** 
  
Seller Stars  0.9990   
(0 .0061)    
 0.9999   
(0 .0061)    
  
Authorised Dealer 0.9252   
(0.0334)**     
0.9196   
(0 .0331)**     
  
Number of Sellers 0.9945   
(0 .0011)***     
0.9945   
(0 .0011)***     
0.9946   
(0 .0012)***     
0.9945   
(0 .0013)***     
Log of Market Size 1.0031    
(0 .0062)      
1.0043    
(0 .0062)      
1.0069    
(0 .0061)      
1.0102    
(0 .0069)      
Relative Price 1.0003   
(0 .0000)***      
 1.0007    
(0 .0001)***       
 
Age 1.0001    
(0.0001)     
1.0001    
(0.0001)     
1.0002  
(0 .0001)**      
1.0002   
(0 .0001)*      
Age-squared 0.9999   
(0.0000)*      
0.9999   
(0.0000)      
0.9999   
(0.0000)***      
0.9999   
(0.0000)      
SLR 0.9786   
(0.0239)     
0.9927   
(0.0240)     
0.9654   
(0.0237)     
0.9960   
(0.0247)      
Compact 0.9801   
(0 .0207) 
0.9794   
(0 .0207) 
0.9647   
(0 .0211)*     
0.9623   
(0 .0186)**     
Ultra-compact 0.9810   
(0 .0212)     
0.9806   
(0 .0212)     
0.9882   
(0 .0214) 
0.9888   
(0 .0188) 
     
Wald test 
[p-value] 
4585.81 
[0.000] 
4504.30 
[0.000] 
1921.29 
[0.000] 
2810.55 
[0.000] 
Number of Entrants 22,079 22,079 22,079 22,079 
Number of Observations 187,757 187,757 187,757 187,757 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimated coefficients in columns (1) and 
(2). Bootstrapped standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimated coefficients in columns (3) 
and (4): *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 4  
 
Effect of entry on change in incumbents’ price 
 
  
All 
Incumbents 
 
All 
Incumbents 
Low 
Reputation 
Low 
Reputation 
High 
Reputation 
High 
Reputation 
 (a1) (a2) (b1) (b2) (c1) (c2) 
       
Entryt-1 -0.0035    
(6.42)***     
  -0.0053    
(6.02)***    
  
 
-0.0009    
(1.63)       
  
Entryt-1: Instrumented  -0.0159    
(6.29)***     
 -0.0236    
(5.80)***    
 -0.0042    
(1.67)*       
Multiple Entryt-1 -0.0046    
(6.22)***    
  -0.0066     
(5.65)***     
 -0.0007    
(0.98)     
 
Multiple Entryt-1: 
Instrumented 
 -0.0204    
(5.64)***    
 -0.0292     
(5.44)***     
 -0.0036    
(1.06)     
Exitt-1 0.0034    
(7.02)***    
0.0034    
(7.09)***    
0.0060    
(7.66)***    
0.0060   
(7.60)***    
0.0005    
(1.06)    
0.0005    
(1.08)    
       
No. of Observations 30,070 30,070 27,149 27,149 29,310 29,310 
Notes: Time dummies included. t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 5 
 
 Effect of entry on change in incumbents’ price, split by entrants’ reputation 
 
  
All Incumbents 
Low 
Reputation 
High 
Reputation 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Low_Rep_Entryt-1 -0.0038    
(5.00)***    
-0.0076     
(6.25)***     
0 .0003      
(0.40)    
High_Rep_Entryt-1 -0.0033 
(4.61)***     
-0.0033    
(2.86)**     
-0.0020    
(2.80)***    
Multiple Entryt-1 -0.0046 
(6.24)***     
 -0.0069    
(5.82)***     
-0.0006 
(0.83)   
Exitt-1 0.0034    
(7.01)***     
0.0060    
(7.64)***    
0.0005   
(1.06)    
    
No. of Observations 30,070 27,149 29,310 
Notes: Time dummies included. t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 6  
 
Effect of discounted and non-discounted entry on change in incumbents’ price 
 
  
All Incumbents 
Low 
Reputation 
High 
Reputation 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Discounted Entryt-1 -0.0086    
(12.87)***    
-0.0110    
(10.33)***   
-0.0037    
(5.45)***   
Non-discounted Entryt-1 0.0044 
(5.42)***    
0.0042    
(3.25)***    
0.0033    
(4.11)***   
Multiple Entryt-1 -0.0049    
(6.74)***    
-0.0070    
(6.01)***    
-0.0009    
(1.27)    
Exitt-1 0.0034    
(7.02)***    
0.0060 
( 7.62)*** 
0.0005 
(1.05)    
    
No. of Observations 30,070 27,149 29,310 
Notes: Time dummies included. t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 7  
 
Effect of entry into top 3 and outside top 3 position 
 
  
All Incumbents 
Low 
Reputation 
High 
Reputation 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Top3 Entryt-1 -0.0056    
(6.26)***    
-0.0080    
(5.40)***   
-0.0017    
(1.82)*   
Outside Top3 Entryt-1 -0.0027    
(4.35)***    
-0.0044    
(4.44)***   
-0.0006    
(0.98)    
Multiple Entryt-1 -0.0046    
(6.23) ***   
-0.0066 
(5.65)***    
-0.0007    
(0.98)    
Exitt-1 0 .0034    
(6.91)***    
0.0060   
(7.58)***    
0.0005 
(1.02)    
    
No. of Observations 30,070 27,149 29,310 
Notes: Time dummies included. t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 8  
 
Effect of entry on change in incumbents’ price, split by entrants’ reputation & pricing 
strategy 
 
  
All Incumbents 
Low 
Reputation 
High 
Reputation 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Low_Rep_Disc_Entryt-1 -0.0083 
(7.71)***    
-0.0193 
(11.27)***    
0.0015 
(1.37)    
Low_Rep_Non-Disc_ Entryt-1 0.0085 
(6.23)***    
0.0156 
( 7.06)***    
0 .0010 
(0.71)    
High_Rep_Disc_Entryt-1 -0.0072 
(7.31)***    
-0.0019 
(1.19)    
-0.0075 
(7.64)***    
High_Rep_Non-Disc_Entryt-1 0.0039 
(3.27)***    
-0.0034 
(1.28)    
0.0066 
(5.56)***    
Multiple Entryt-1 -0.0042 
(5.75)***    
-0.0065 
(5.62)***    
-0.0004 
(0.56)    
Exitt-1 0.0031 
(6.52)***    
0.0057 
(7.31)***    
0.0004 
(0.85)    
    
No. of Observations 30,070 27,149 29,310 
Notes: Time dummies included. t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 9  
 
Effect of entry on incumbents’ price, split by entrants’ reputation, pricing and 
positioning strategy 
 
 All 
Incumbents 
Low 
Reputation 
High 
Reputation 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Low_Disc_Top3_Entryt-1 -0.0157 
(10.43)***    
-0.0294 
 (12.05)***    
0.0022 
(1.42)    
Low_Non-Disc_Top3_ Entryt-1 0.0132 
(6.15)***    
0.0235 
(6.52)***   
0.0000 
(0.10)    
Low_Disc_Out_Top3_ Entryt-1 -0.0072 
(6.85)***    
-0.0166 
(10.13)***    
-0.0003 
(0.25)    
Low_Non-Disc_Out_Top3_ Entryt-1 0.0033 
(2.43)**    
0.0110 
(5.10)***    
-0.0001 
(0.40)    
High_Disc_Top3_Entryt-1 -0.0110 
(7.06) ***   
-0.0022 
(0.86)    
-0.0122 
(7.75)***    
High_Non-Disc_Top3_ Entryt-1 0.0031 
(1.62)   
-0.0081 
(2.54)**   
0.0067 
(3.50)***    
High_Disc_Out_Top3_ Entryt-1 -0.0063 
(6.06) ***   
-0.0031 
(1.24) 
-0.0056 
(5.39)***    
High_Non-Disc_Out_Top3_ Entryt-1 0.0033 
(2.71)***    
-0.0021 
(1.05)    
0.0059 
(4.78)***    
Multiple Entryt-1 -0.0050 
(6.79)***    
-0.0078 
(6.68)***    
-0.0006   
(0.83)    
Exitt-1 0.0033 
(6.86)***    
0.0060 
(7.69)***    
0.0004 
(0.90)    
    
No. of Observations 30,070 27,149 29,310 
Notes: Time dummies included. t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 10  
 
Effect of temporary and long-term entry on change in incumbents’ price  
 
 All 
Incumbents 
Low 
Reputation 
High 
Reputation 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Temporary Entryt-1 -0.0050   
(7.24)***   
-0.0081   
(7.21)***    
-0.0003 
(0.48)   
Long-term Entryt-1 -0.0010 
(1.24)    
-0.0019 
(1.52)    
0 .0002 
( 0.30)    
Multiple Entryt-1 -0.0034 
(4.74)***    
-0.0045 
(3.93)***    
-0.0003 
(0.47)    
Exitt-1 0.0032    
(6.54)***    
0.0058 
(7.41)***    
0.0005 
(1.07)    
    
No. of Observations 30,070 27,149 29,310 
Notes: Time dummies included. t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The robustness issue is debated by inter alia Weitzman (1983), Shepherd (1984) and Farrell (1986b) 
and the empirical predictions are examined in Morrison and Winston (1987), Hurdle et al. (1989) and 
references therein. 
2 The term employed by both Baumol et al (1982) and Farrell (1986b). 
3 Some PCS platforms charge a monthly listing fee. Clearly, on those sites – unlike NexTag.com – there 
is an obvious sunk cost of market entry. 
4 Since the shopbot does not publish its ranking algorithm, the weight given to factors other than the 
bid cannot be determined. 
5 For example, Baye et al. (2009) report a ceteris paribus decline in clicks of 17% per ranking position, 
with a 40% discontinuity between positions one and two. Their results are sensitive to the number of 
sellers with further discontinuities at the ends of pages. 
6 It has been suggested that attracting interest in this way inflates clicks for the top-ranked sellers in the 
listing but correspondingly lowers their conversion rates: see http://www.mobile-o.com/docs/Top-
Vertical-Search-Sites.html viewed on 30th Oct. 2008. 
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7 Baye and Morgan (2001) pose an insider-outsider model in which entry reduces the proportion of 
uninformed buyers thus encouraging sellers to pursue the more price sensitive consumers and so 
generating a predicted negative relationship between price and n. This is achieved by introducing entry 
costs which, in reality, appear trivial in many e-markets. 
8 This type of low quality hit-and-run entry in e-markets may be favored by the ease of exit and 
subsequent name change which reduces the incentive to build reputations [Ellison and Ellison (2009)]. 
9 Empirical evidence across e-commerce – reviewed in OFT (2007) - suggests both a much more 
frequent and smaller price adjustments than occurs in traditional markets. 
10 Specific software to generate and transfer product feed data via FTP is available for as little as $25.   
11 Some shopbots, such as Shopper.com, obviate this requirement by providing small sellers with 
storefront services which provide them with a selling site in exchange for commission. 
12 Although collection was automated, screen shot data does require some cleaning before use and time 
costs prohibited more frequent visits.  
13 The upc originally appeared on Nextag’s screen display but is currently not available.   
14 We used a cut-off of 100 leads since we were interested in studying behaviour in active markets.  
15We chose a tax free zip code in New Hampshire. 
16 We also repeated all of the analysis using final prices including shipping costs. This did not 
materially affect our results.  
17 This is the number of exits for which we have a record of their entry.   
18 This is calculated by dividing the average number of entrants/exits by day by the average number of 
seller-product observations and then multiplying by seven to arrive at a weekly figure. 
19 Our duration analysis necessarily takes product, seller and market characteristics as exogenous or at 
least pre-determined. No doubt at a finer – but unobservable – level of disaggregation potential entrants 
and incumbents are exploring their conjectures about one another’s behaviour. Thus our duration 
analysis of the determinants of exit are strictly reduced form estimates, More complex interactions are 
explored on the pricing side below.  
20 Some entrants survive beyond the end of our sample period. 
21 The probability of discounted entry is determined by seller-specific characteristics, which themselves 
determine the duration of a seller’s visit, resulting in a simultaneity problem.  In an earlier paper (see 
Haynes and Thompson 2013), we found that seller-specific characteristics dominate market factors in 
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the entry decision. The coefficients in the probit regression are all individually significant at the one 
percent level.  
22 Vella and Verbeek (1999) show that this type of IV estimator generates results similar to Heckman’s 
(1978, 1979) endogeneity bias corrected OLS estimator. All of the seller reputation variables used as 
regressors in the discounted entry probit estimation were significant at the 1% level or above.  
23 If we look at sellers who enter at or below the previous period’s minimum price then that hazard is 
even higher. The proportion of entrants entering at or below the previous period minimum price is 
approximately 27% of the total number of entries taking place. The results from this estimation are 
included in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
24 A similar result was obtained when membership of the top three sellers in the default ranking was 
used instead.  
25 A Chi-squared test on the difference between the high and low reputation coefficients is highly 
significant.   
26 These decisions have been modelled as a joint decision process in earlier work by Haynes and 
Thompson (2013). 
27 Frank and Salkever (1997) report that entry by generic pharmaceuticals stimulates price cuts among 
other generic sellers but price increases among branded sellers while Simon (2005) finds entry into a 
magazine segment triggers price cuts among the more recently-founded titles. McCann and Vroom 
(2010) report broadly similar findings for hotels. 
28 Since entry is potentially endogenous, we re-estimate equation (3) after instrumenting entry.  As in 
the duration model, we use predicted values from a probit regression of entry on seller reputation 
variables as an instrument. Since the instrumented variables do not alter the pattern of our results, for 
space reasons, we have not reported the instrumented results for Tables 4 through to 9. These results 
are available from the authors.  
29 These results are available from the authors.  
 
 
